distribution of power gaye the United States a chance to dominate parts of the Third World.
The Cold War has now ended between the main protagonists. The ideological barrier collapsed in the course of the past few years. But the Cold War is stili continuing in the sense that the United States now has more elbow room in its quest for domination. The major threats to American interests are stili the rtgimes, trying to be responsiye to their people. As long as they have priorities other than the United States, such as the diversification of their economies, some words instead of "Communist", no longer in vogue, are being fo und for those foreign statesmen who get in the way.
Until the (second) Gulf War in Iate 1990 and early 1991, the U.S. military had two different concepts of strategic thinking. One concemed highintensity conflict, that is, a war with the Warsaw Pact countnes fought with heavy weapons, theoretically including the nuclear ones as well, and the second, formulated to respond to guerilla warfare in some Third World nations, to be a low-intensity conflict, carned out with comparatively lighter weapons, which could be escalated, as in Vietnam, depending on the circumstances. Both of these a1tematives had their own doctrines, strategy, taetics and weaponry.
The end of the Cold War changed this situation. Initially, the public thought that the new phenomenon would alter military thinking and organization radically, and that the needed sources of the nation could now flow into the non-military sector. Af ter all, a European war of formerly anticipated intensity was out of the question. Presently, the U.S. needed only a fraction of the armed forces it had maintained in the pası. Although this logic of the post-Cold War era should have been a release for the average man, it was not so for circles such as the professionaJ military, the defence contractors and formulators of strategy, whose existence or function, depended on high spending for the armed forces.
lt was the Gulf War that "1cgitimized" a new assertion of p ax Americana. This is a renovated phenomenon, based on the concept of socalled "new enemies" whiçh posses up-to-date conventional weapons, pemaps with some additional nuelear capability. Consequently, a mid-intensity connict theory developed from this contention that substantial military power was stili needed in the post-Cold War era. The new theory, which may be termed the "Bush Dactnne", met the requirements of the institutions and people whose livelihood depended on high military anacations. The removal of the "Vietnam syndrome" was the first hurdle that President George Bush had to overcome.
Blocking demoeracy domestically in the United States is much more complex than doing the same in the international arena. This does not mean that there cannot be crises of democracy in the eountry, but an army massacre as it oecurred in My Lai cannot be repeated at home. However, intemationally, not only Panama's Manuel Noriega may be removed by invasion, but subsequent efforts may be seen as necessary to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome."
The Soviet Union apo[ogized for its invasions in Eastem Europc and in Afghanistan. But the United States did not foIlow such a Icad for its overt and eovert interferences in Latin America, the overthrow of the demoeratic govemments of Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973) . the invasion of South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic or the campaign of terrorism against Cuba. The withdrawal of Soviet support to actors of opposition to American policics gives the United States now more scope to impose its preferences.
However, white the United States longs for a chieftanship without a rival, it is constantly losing ground, this time, to Japan and Europe.3 it no longer has the economic power to influence the consequences of the transformation in the form er Eastem bloc of nations. Germany, some other Westem European nations, and Japan are utilizing this opportunity. The combined GNP of the European Comman Market is as big as that of the United States. Japan's economy is the second largest of any natian in the Westem world. Both are capturing, even in the United States, markets and technology for eonsumer goods that the Americans used to dominate. In the Paeifie Rim, most of the Asian countries in the are from Japan to Australia are now part of the economic boom that led to a combincd GNP three-fourth as large as the United States or the European Comman Market. Targeting industrial areas, including ground transportation, electronics. aviation, and ultimately space, the Japanese economy may capture the U.S. domestie markets over the long term.
Double Standard vis-a-vis Iraq:
Considering the general evaluation in the preceding paragraphs, it is no surprise, then, that the immediate goal of the bipartisan American war drive and the assault on Iraq was to change the relationship of forces in the Gulf region, install a new regime in Baghdad, outbid other Westem competitors in the area, and realize a victory that. in the word s of President George Bush (1989-93) , would kick the "Vietnam syndrome once and for alı."4 Iraq's auack and invasion of Kuwait (1990) and the subsequent war couJd have been avoided. 5 The United States was sending mixed messages to Iraq, giving the impression that militaey action against Kuwait would not provoke American retaliation. Apart from being full of falsehoods and phantasies,6 the war that ensued reveals double standards.
The Gulf crisis, the counıdown, the baule and its aftermath are full of misinformation, misconceptions and omissions. Perhaps the most significant reality is that the American Goveroment did not decide to go to war against Iraq in order to establish a "new world order", as so enunciated by the former President Bush. Just the opposite. The dccision to escalate the confrontation to war was aimed at leaving the United States unrivalled as the only dominant power in the Middle East while there were other rivals regionally and internationally. Washington, which had generally supported Iraq against Iran during the fırst Gulf War (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , had the most to lose from a shift of power in the Gulf region.
The world was surprised at the efficiency that the U.S. militaey had exhibited. it was, indeed, the result of years of planning and funding, going back to the failure of the Nixon Doctcine (1969) and its replacement by the Carter Doctrine (1980) . The foemer had declared that the future allies would deal with the ir own security with American weapons but without American troops. The fall of the Shan in Iran (1979) and the Soviet militaey presence in Afghanistan (1979) brought fonh Carter's conception that the U.S. would react. including with armed force, to what it calls assaults against its own interests.
it was during Ronald Reagan 's presideney (1981-89) that the construction program for new or expanded militaey bases became ambitious. For instance, virtually "militaey cities" grew in parts of Saudi Arabia. which led (1982) to the sale of $ 8.5 billion worth of AWACS aircraft. the largest single arms dcal in American history. if gave advantages to Saudi Arabia over Iraq, Iran and Yemen (but not over Israel). Apart from the fact that its operations, spare parts and maintenance rcquired U.S. support, joint militaey exercises made the people in the region as well as the American public accustomed to the presence of U.S. troops there. Iran being then the main "enemy", neither the Iraqi aııack on the U.S.S. Stark killing about forty American sailors. nor the allegation that Iraq uscd (1988) When the war cam e, it was a slaughter, American commanders referring to "turkey shoots". The mass media prevented the release of news that civilian targets were being hiL lt was as if the war was fought over "real estate", not on people. The truth is otherwise.
lt is true that Iraq invaded Kuwait but Israel also attacked Lebanon (1982) .7 Although there are some differences in these two situalions, they favour Iraq and the Paleslinians. Iraq attacked Kuwait. which is of course an aggression, only af ter the failure to reach a negotiated settlement. Israel attacked Lebanon to avoid a compromise, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was willing to negotiate with its adversary. A compromise would have meant an end to the regime in the occupied territories. Israel chose to attack. The United States did not show a response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in any way similar to the one seen Citfor Iraq.
The Israeli attack caused the death of some 20,000 people. A few hundred died on account of the Iraqi invasion. While both assaults caused denth, there is a large numerical difference. Iraq admiued that it resorted to chemical weapons, outlawed and brutal, against against some of its adversaries. Israel denied, but nevertheless used various bombs and devices, considered crimina! acts.
Iraq's action was invasion of a sovereign state, independent since mid-1961. But it had a debatable claim since the time of Abdel Kerim Qassem (not Saddam Hussein), expresscd only a few days after Kuwait's independence and based on its former (hefore 1899) status within the Ottoman vilayet (province) of Basra. British forces rushed to Kuwait, and the invasion from the north did not materialize. While the Iraqi claim is debatable, as apoint of view that may or may not have a legal basis, Israeli expansion apparently could not be subject even to any discussion. Its origins are supposcd to be in the Bible, and therefore, non-negotiable and pcrmanenı 7United Nations. The Questlon or Palestine: 1979 -1990 . NewYork. 1991 lt is true that Iraq ilI-trcated same of the civilian population in occupied Kuwail. Israel took 1200 hostages from Lebanon to guarantee the behaviour of the ıocaı people. Same property has been destroyed in Kuwait. But Israel wiped off the map hundreds of Palestinian villages.
President Bush took pride that the United Nations had finaııy united against the aggressor -Iraq. The same United Nations had united previously on a number of occasions, condemning Israeli aggression on Lebanon, its annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and its human rights violations. In each of these cases, Israel was either the only U.N. member casting a negative vote or was accompanied by the United States only. it was the United States alone that opposed Security Council draft resolutions threatening sanctions against Israel.
The six-week bombardment and one-hundrcd.hour invasion oflraq by the United States (and its allies) devastated the country. The attacking forces conducted a militarized slaughter of simply defenseless Iraqis in unifonn, abandoned in trenches, trying to nee Kuwait and return back home. They were not fighting, but neeing people. The American forces bombed both ends of the highway from Kuwait city to Basra and sealed them off, and shot at almost every human being in between. If the names of all the victims should be writıcn on granite walls, like the Washington memorial for the dead in Vietnam, they would stretch beyand the distance the naked eye can see.
When ex-President Bush visited Kuwait in early 1993, the police arrested there suspects, same of whom were Iraqis, and charged them wilh an alleged plot to assassinate the American statesman. The line of thinking seemed to be that Iraq wantcd to "punish Bush" for having led the war against il. In June 1993, the United States launched missiles from its warships in the Red Sea in the directian of Iraq's capital, most of them striking the headquarters building of the Intelligence Service in Baghdad but same landing off target and killing civilians. President Bill Clinton's administratian defended the American action on the basis of "sclf -defence", as response to an allegcd Iraqi plot to kill the ex-presidenl. Baghdad denicd the charge.
But Artiele 51 of the U.N. Charter, which permits resort LO force only in self-defence, introduces same limits and conditions as welL. Self-defence is an acceptable concept, but its broad interprelation opcns the door to aggression. Self-defence involves "hostilities", not a single murder. Marcover, whoever was involved, the attempt, if true, never tcached its sa-called aim. There was no attaek. Even if it was planned, it was frustrated. Further, there was no evidence of similar Iraqi attacks in progress. So, it cannot even be "anticipatory self-deCence", which is controversial in international law.
Article SI states that an "anned attaek" should have occurred. This is not the [VOL XXI case. The United Slates might have dccided that way on its own, but this is usurping the functions of the U.N. Security CounciL. Further,the raid on Baghdad was not a proportional response. The U.N. Charter prohibits (Artiele 2/4) any resort Lo force, except in self-defence, provided that the case is really self-defence and in proper limits. Slates are obliged to seule their differences, moreover, by peaceful means only (Artiele 33). A. U.N. member cannot do what it wants, and then go to the Security Council, and use its veto privilege Lo slOp aresolution condemning its action.
The outeome of the Gulf war contrasts with American invasions of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) . In the case of the latter two, Washington carried through limited armed operations and imposed on both capitals servile administrations within record time. Whether or not the Slatus quo in these two societies or in the whole of Latin America may be mainlained in the future is another question. But military mastery was accompanied by immediate political triumph. Militaey success in Iraq, on the other hand, did not bring the same trophy. it set in motion, instead, new engagements and struggles.
Although seemingIy waged behind the façade of a "broad international coalition," the war was a U.S. government operation. It gaye the United Slates additional leverage over its rivals. For inslance. England had to be content with a junior position in an area which was once a "British lake." France, which once enjoyed special ties with Baghdad, did not regain a beuer economic foothold. Japan is still dependent on imported oiL. Turkey, Iraq's immediate northem neighbour, received serious economic blows from honouring the continuing blockade, which disconnects the now of oil and funds from Iraq. None of the governments, save Iran and Turkey, which supported the American initiative in the Gulf, opened their borders to the refugees. Some, much later, agreed Lo accept only selected few families of symbolic nature.
While the American companies have been awarded the overwhelming majority of the reconstruction projects in Kuwait, the embargo on Iraq penalizes the people because it keeps foad, water, medicine and other vilal necessities away from them. There is a dramatic increase in the death rales especially of children and elderly people. With factories, irrigation works, electrical generation plants and various other facilities being destroyed, this was a tolal war, putting out of action almost everything that would help continue normal life.
Double Standard in Nuclear Weaponry:
The war on Iraq also uncovered the Baghdad regime's secret drive to become a nuclear power. The overwhelming majority of the governments, led by the United Slates, is against that, especial1y when it is known that Iraq had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The same counlries are sensitive over similar developmenLS elsewhere, in North Korea for instance. But the United States lreated Israel very differently. Israel, which did not sign the NPT and did not al10w the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to carry out inspections on iLSterritory, became a nuclear power in secret. This secret was sanctioned and shared by the top officials of the United States since the Eisenhower years.
Few writers in the West dwelled on Israel's nuclear arsenaL. Some produced, nevenheless, insightful worlcs on the development of that country's nuelear capability.8 David Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister and Defence Minister , was quoted several times that his counlry would build an atamic reaclOr using iLSnatural uranium and heavy water. While Israel had supporters in the U.S. Congress, several individuals led the pro-Israeli lobby LOinfluence the American executive, there was a secret fund-raising for the Israeli bom b, and the Washington bureaucracy aided the Israeli effon in more ways than one.
Abraham Feinberg, an ardent Zionist who c<>ordinated the fund-raising drive for President Harry S. Truman's (1945-53) campaign, was Ben-Gurion's most lrusted al1y in the United States. Lewis L. Slrauss, a Jewish American who happened LObe the chair-man of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and who had met, not only his Israeli counterpart Emest David Bergman, but also Dr. Chaim Weizmann as early as 1930, was approving Israel's nuclear program. A few of the Jewish American physicisLS, some of whom had worked in nuelear projecLS in the Uniıcd States, wentto Israel. Some of those who came back gave the CIA officials specific information on Israel's quest to have nuelear weapons. They also told that Israel was raising large amounts of money from the Jewish American community to be used for that pUrpose. The latter were already providing large amounLS every year. But a particular group, known as the "Commitlee of Thirty", raised money for "special weapons" project. Some of these Jewish millionaires visited the Israeli nuclear worlcs at Dimona af ter their completion. It was the United States that helped finance and fuel the fırst smail reactor at Nahal Soreq near Telaviv.
The U-2 spying flighLS over Soviet territory also gave information on the Israeli nuclear activities in the Negev desen. The CIA developed and analyzed films from the U-2 missions and transmiued the results LOPresident Eisenhower. The findings were also sent to the Jewish chainnan of the U.S. AlOmic Energy Commission. There is no doubt that the United States saw the Israeli construction at Dimona going up. While U-2 flights were going on, Israel was digging a second underground site for the chemicaI reprocessing plantlO make weapons-grade plutonium. Evidence proved that 8For instance: Seymour M. Hersch, The Samson Opt1on: Israel, Amerlea and the Bomb, London. Faber and Faber, ı993.
(VOL XXI Israel was determined LO manufacture nuelear bombs. President Eisenhower and his advisors looked the other way.
All of the American administrations of the post-Eisenhower era were aware of the developments in Israel's nuelear capability. Only for President John F. Kennedy (1961-63) , Dimona was an impediment for rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Nasscr's Egypt, two of his foreign policy goals. But even his advisor on Jewish and Israeli affairs, Myer Feldman, visited Dimona in 1962 and knew that Israel was planning and preparing to build the bomb. Although this was the case, none of the Kennedy biographies, including the one by Arthur Schlesinger, offers information about Israel's quest for the nucIear bomb.
Israel never agreed to an IAEA inspcction, but only to a "check up" by an American team, which was in fact a whitewash, the scheduled visit being announced well in advance, with no spot checks allowed and a control room constructed to mislead the investigators. President Lyndon B. Johnson's (1963-69) Golan Heights in 1973, everything initially seemed lost for Israel, whieh ealled its nuelear alert. Had it not reeeived military aid from the United States, it would probably have rcsorted to nuelear means. The bombs were actually put in forward positions, to be taken back from there when the threat both in Sinai and the Golan Heights was removed. This had been the "Samson option," meaning that Israel was ready LOextinguish itself and its enemies, just as Samson, according to the Bible, given baek his strength for the last time, had brought down the temple pillars and the roof killing all, ineluding himself. The American government chose not to speak about it even when the issue was dcbated inside Israel.
When Americats first KH-1I, the satellite whirling around the world every ninety-six minutes and taking reconnaissance phoLOgraphs, had been launched (1979 ), President Jimmy Carter (1977 provided Isracı with aeriaI photographs, furnishing the lalter with classified information on all potentially threatening movements one-hundred miles inside the borders of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypl. The limit being a certain distance, the information did not eover any activity inside Iraq, Libya or Pakistan. A high proportion of the top American officals anticipated at that time that the Israelis would do everything to surpass the limil.
Israel requested and reeeived KH-I I coverage of most of the European part of the Soviet Union. In other words, it had access to intelligence information far beyond the one-hundred mile limit. and no quarter in the United States moniLOred to see what Israel was actually doing and how it put that information into use. Isracı bombed (1981) the lraqi "Tammuz" (Osirak) reactor, twelve miles southeast of Baghdad. with the F-16s purchased from the United States for defensiye purposes only. The bombing having caused wide protests, the American executive announced that further deliveries wouId be stopped, but more aircraft were released only two months later. In contrast ID the lraqi reaCIDr, the Israeli eomplex was producing plutonium for nuclear weapons.
The world came to know about the details of the Dimona ehemieal reprocessing plant when the London Sundaı Times printed the inside sIDry of Mordeehai Vanunu, a Moroccan Jew. 1 When Israel launched its first satellite into orbit in Iate 1988. scientists, ineluding the Americans, estimated that the same rocket booster had the eapacity to send a nuelear warhead to targets more than six-thousand miles away. Isracl now is believed IDhave a few hundred neutron warheads.
That eountry became a nuelear power with the knowledge, if not the collusion. of the United States, which show s utmost sensitivity when some ı0Detoher S, 1986. Apart from Iraq, the world is going through crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Palestine/ Israel. The reactions of the American government to each of these have been different and sclective.
The "Moslems" of Bosnia-Herzegovina were one of the products of the Ottoman (Turkish) presence in the Balkans for about five centuries. They were e1assified as "Moslems" in form er Yugoslavia, as one of the "peoples", along with the Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Slovenes. "Nationalities" (meaning minarities) and "ethnic groups" constituted other categories. The Turks, Albanians. and other Moslems fall into different groups. The Bosnian MosIems now face starvation, murder, assassination, mass rape, sniping at civilians, hindrances to humanitarian aid and defiance of the United Nations, on the part of the Serbs. For all intents and purposes, the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a member of the United Nations, is being dismantled while the world looks on. Few countries, among them Turkey, took initiatives to limit the extraordinary drama. The delay in the case of Bosnia bodes ill for the future, and suggests that the liberatian of Kuwait was motivated by direct interesl. The Serbs are counting on keeping what they have laken by force.
• Responsibility Hes not only with govemment and the armed forces of Serbia. All governments which have aided or abetted war crimes are alsa guilty of "non-assistance" to the victim. American inıerest, so far, is limited to the airdropping of food and medical supplies over Bosnia's capital Sarajevo. much of which apparently did not reach the trappcd MasIem inhabitants.Although one may argue thallhe arms embargo helpcd. in a way, to limit the hostilities, it adversely affecıed the weaker parıy and was, thus, discriminatory towards the Bosnian Moslems. The Scrbs, in the meantime, achieved their twin goals of aILering the demographic realityand redrawing the frontiers. Moreover, the changes are taking place ıhrough a ruthless genocide, nothing comparable to Iraq's attack on Kuwait.
The big losers are the Bosnian Moslems. who are in the bitter role of "Europe's Palestinians." There is no doubtthatthere is an ethnic e1easing in Bosnia. In fact, ethnic e1eansing is very much with us, not only in fürrner Yugoslavia. but alsa in Palcstine/Israel. The lalter case is actually the mother of ethnic eleasing in the post-World War II period. Before the Zionists came and founded their own state there, Palesıine was well inhabiıed. That was aıready noıed even by a number of Europcans, who visiıed lhe land of the Bible and went up and down the country in all directions and noıcd down the names of the many hundred Arab villages. Before, during and afLer (he 1948 war, theZionists expelled hundreds' of tfiousands of Palesıinians. The Palmach, Haganah, Irgun and Stern did everything to encourage them LO flee. 11 The year Israel was created, the Zionists owned only 6 percenı of the tand. The resl was added through war, occupalİon, and ethnic cleansing. This transformaıion came aboul afıer a prolonged and tragically successfuĩ nvasion of an alien people under Wesıem, principaIIy American, auspices. The resull was theexpulsion of most of the people whose country it was.
Further, Israel seized Washington's war drive ıo increase its garrisonstale brutality in the occupied territories, southem Lebanon, and behind the Green Line. The repressive measures have produced serious human rights violations, inc1uding deportation, denial of the right to return, desbUction of dweIIings, general i11-treatment, lorture under detention, mass arrests, the transformalian of the histarical landscape, pi11age of cultural sights, and interference in educaLİon.
The United States has a special responsibility for financing the seıtlements for the new immigrants from the form er Sovieı Union. Israeli leadership has a nightmare: an Arab majority even in "Greaıer Israel". East Jerusalem is one of the important largets. The United States, which has not openly supported Israel's cIaim to the whole of Jerusalem, did nol oppose it in any concrete manner. As the Soviet Jews pour in, the United States looks the other way and releases loans in the hope thaı the money wi11 be used wiıhin the "Green Line." This armistice line of 1948 is not a legal designalion, and the Israelis have moved it in their minds to incIude East Jerusalem. But the policy of settling the new immigrants anywhere may be the cause of another cIash. Not only the Arabs wi11 find it more difficulllO accept the perrnanent lass of their territories, but also the Palestinian exodus LOopen room for the newly-arriving Jews wiII sweII the refugee camps in the neighbouring states. The United States has great responsibility in the tuming of the occupation into a continuing facı.
In comparison LO America's delayed and tok en interesı in the fate of the Bosnian Moslems and tacit or active support of ethnic c1cansing in Palestine, the American presence in Somalia has been presented as a life-saving mission launched with the best of motives. How did a country which has nol exhibited altruisLİc intentions in many other cases become so charitable now? Why does aSomali civil war and famine demand military intervention when the tragedy in Bosnia has failed to attract similar attention for so long? The United States again appears to be extremely seleclİve in its dispcnsalion of humanilarian concem. Westem intervention also helps "Iegitimize" interventions of the past by implieation.
Although Somalia is one of the rare eountries in Afriea which is Iimguistically. religiously and ethnically homogenous. it does not exist as a single entity any longer. it has become a mosaie of elan-ruled regions. In spite of the homogeneous population. it was always the clan system that defined the society. The defeat in the disastrous Ogaden War, and the overlhrow of the Siad Barre regime led to a further rcjeclion of the eenlralized authority. The resull was a civil war among warlords. whose supporters killed and looted while the people faced a famine. A brilliant suggestion by Mohammed Sahnoun, the U.N. Sccrcınry-General's special envoy. who enjoyed deep respect among the Somalis. to distribute salaries and uniforms to the local militias in order to disciple them, was not implemented.
When the United States intervened, the worst part of the famine was over. The reasons for American intervention may be summarized as follows: to prove that the U.N. could not function wiıhout U.S. involvement; to ereate a precedent for selective future interventions; to gain a foothold near the strategic Bab el-Mandeb; to be present in the Ham of Africa where Sudan pursued an Islamist policy ıowards ilS southem citizens as well; to boIster the Pentagon budget; and to back up the U.S. Continenınl Oil Company interested in oil in the nonbcastem part of the counlry.
6. The Sidra Affair, the Lockerbie Case and Legality:
The U.S. administration announced sanetions against Libya on alleged grounds that Libyan leadership was involved in terrorist aııacks. The "evidenee" in the bombings in Rome. Vienna and Berlin is far from being eoncIusive. The U.S. used the dispute over the Gulf of Sidra. which is a legal issue, to ovenbrow and/or kill the Libyan Icader. The American attack as well as the aııempt to kill the head of a govemment or st.ate are boıh against international law. Moreover, the accusaLions lhalthe two Libyan naıionals were responsible for the atrocity over Lockerbie remain unsubstantiated. unproven and unconvincing. More import.antly, ıhe Uniıed Sıntes has com e LO use, or abuse, the United Na Lions as a means to punish cOUnlries with policies that contradict American inıeresıs. In respeeı lo Libya, like the Iraqi case. double standards have been applicd.
Explosions near EI-Al offiees in Rome and Vicnna had eaused the death of innocent people. including five Amerieans. The ex-President Reagan ardered that all Amerieans living in Libya leave the eounlry, ıhat all Libyan asselS in American banks be frozen, and ıhaı two aireraft carriers be dispatehed to the Gulf of Sidra. With the addiıion of a ıhird naval force. the U.S. administration deeided to penelrate the Gulf of Sidra and ıhereby precipitated a militaey conflict that caused the destruction of two Libyan naval crafts. a missile site and the death of Libyan sailors.
An explosion on a TW A jet killed another four Americans, and asimilar attack at a West Berlin discotheque kiııed two more. The U.S. Govemment again blamed the Libyan Icadership for this, and ordered two carriers back to the Gulf of Sidra. The latter destroyed Libyan radars. and killed about 40 people, wounding close to 200, mostly civilians.
With these actions, President Rcagan had provoked a militaey conflict expecting a Libyan defeat to be foııowed by a coup against the present govemment in Tripoli. The U.S. 6th Fleet and its aircraft penetrated the disputed waters of the Gulf of Sidra. and held hostile maneuvers near the Libyan oil installations. The United States seems to have expected the whole Libyan air force to become engaged with the American fleet and face defeat, causing a change of govemment it may be remembered in this connectİon that the U.S. has an "air defence identİfication zone" around its borders. Any unidentified object will be intercepted and will probably be destroyed. The U.S. will never tolerate a foreign state to maneuver or indulge in hostİle air operatİons right near its strategic or economic facilities. It may not accept the Libyan assenion that the Gulf of Sidra is an "inland water", but this is purely alegal matter, to be decided in a peaceful way. American attack violates Articles 2/3 and 2/4 of the U.N. Charter, and Article 33 expects the exhaustion of all peaceful means. Thcre is also the doctrine of "histüric waters", which entİtles a state to draw a closing line eve n if iı excecds otherwise intemationally recognized criteria. The U.S. also made use of the same doctrine.
if the reason for armed intervention was the al1eged .sponsorship of terrorism, this could also have been submitted to the judgement 'Üf the World Coun, as so proposed by Libya itself. The American executİve did not agree to that because it apparently wanted to use both disputes as pretexts to provoke the Libyan Icadership into a militaey confliict. it should be added bere that the ltalian and Austrian minisıers of Inıerior Slated that Gaddafi was not responsible for the attacks in Rome and Vienna, and the WestGerman police rejected a link between Libya and the discotheque bombing.
These events served as pretexts for drastic militaey action against Libya. in one instance, Gaddafi's residence. in the midst of civilian quaners, was also bombed, killing an adopted baby daughter. An attempt to ki il a head of state or govemment is against The Hague Regulatİons (1907), the Army Field Manual on the law of warfare (1956) In the opinion of some legal experts, American (and British) accusations against Libya, in conneetion with the explosion and crash (1988) of a PanAmerican aircraft in Lockerbie (Scotland), also emanate from political preferences and are deprived of acceptable legalbasis. 12 The United States seeured several U.N. Seeurity Council resolutions, using its overwhelming influence in coercing other members to vote in favour.
Libya complied with the terms of the Montreal Convention (1973), which elaborates on safety in air travel and communications. it instituted eriminal proceedings against two suspects, who are its citizens. It has not extradited them, there being no extradition treaty in force between it and the United States (and Britain) and no basis for the extradition of the accused. The United States violated international law by refusing to tum over to Libya whatever evidence it might have.
The UNSC Resolution 748 (1992) was passed with five abstentions, China being one of them. But Aniele 27/3 of the U.N. Charter requires the affırmative votes of the permanent members. it also states that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. On the basis of these reservations, one may assert the ilIegality of the U.N. decisions.
Without underestimating the seriousness of the incident which caused the loss of innocent lives, the rigid American pasition is based on the logic of force. The two accused Libyan nationals have a basic human right to a fair trial before an impartial court. Not power politics, but the role of law should be supreme. The U.S. is violating the U.N. Charter by elosing the door of resort to a peaceful solution of disputes. Further, although the members cansider the Seeurity Council as acting in their name (Artiele 24/1), the same organ is expected to conform to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations (Article 24/2). While the United States is orchestrating the Security Council (the least democratic of the U.N. organs), General Assembly (the most democratic) is kept powerless.
A new world order respectful of the role of law, on the other hand, implies that the U.N. Seeurity Council should act in conformity with the principles of international (aw and justice. The United States used its power and influence to induce others to vote in favour. Under American leadership, the Seeurity Council, in sanctioning Libya, excceded its powers. 
The Latin American Seene:
Although the United States is lrying to build areputation for itself as the protector of persecuted minorities, such as the Bosnian Moslems, the worst atroeities in the Latin American world were carried out in the domains of U.S. influence and control. 13 The United States has been tormenting the countries below its southem frontier for more than a century. Up until the Cuban Revolution, the United States endeavored to isoiate Latin America from changes occurring in the world and preserve the status quo. In the decade af ter the Cuban Revolution, Washington tried to put a sanitary cordon around that regime. Since then, it gradually retreated from its unvaried hard-Iine in Latin America and introduced a differentiated approach according to the specific position of each country.
Revising its Latin American policy from time to time, Washington follows various patterns such as "Big Sück," "dollar diplomacy," "goOO neighbour" and "new frontiers" policies. But these changes stay within the limits of two fundamental approaches: a ham line, characterized by intervention, pressure and alliances with dictators and cooperation as a more flexible means of influence and expansion. Most recently, it has acted to destabilise the situation in Panama, Nicaragua and Cuba.
The United States opposes change if it does not conform to its own interests. Changes are resisted even if some states are run by gangster cIiques. Manuel Noriega was removed by invasion when he stole the 1989 election that had been won by the U.S.-backed Guillermo Endara. The same Noriega had stolen the 1984 election with more violence but he was then America's ruffian, working cIosely with the CIA and opposing Arias, a "dangerous nationaIist." Former President Ronald Reagan had described Rios Mont. the Guatemalan dictator who had slaughtered thousands of his own counlrymen and driven from their home s many more, as a man of great personaI integrity totaIly committed to demoeracy.
The United States was widely condemned when it invaded Panama (1989), on the pretext that this isthmian counlry had impeded the operation of the Canai, that Washington was acting in self-defence against anticipated attacles on American personnel in Panama, and that it had acted to arrest General Manuel Noriega on drug traflicking charges. indigeneous authorities gradually, the fina( transfer to lake place on the last day of 1999. The other treaty required the two countries to ensure that the Canal be accessible to the shipping of alı.
Although then President Bush said that the American actions were meant to honour the commitrnents under the treaties, Panama had not breached its obligations, and the U.S. had no unilateral right to intervene militarily. The Canal was recognized as Panamanian territory. The U.S. could intervene only against entities other than Panama. Morcover, a "statement of understanding" As for self-defence, Panama could not wage a war against the U.S. It had not done so or was about to do it. The U.S. had no legitimate basis, but only pretexts for invasion. Such militaey intrusion to make an arrest also violates a state's sovereignty.
There is a coherence between the U.S. assertion of self-defence and justification of American military action in other events. The U.S. invaded Grenada (1983) arguing that this pctty Caribbean state was going to invade neighbouring countries. it forcibly stopped (1985) an Egyptian plane over the international waters of the Mediterranean, and kept people on bo ard in custody on grounds that they hijacked a cruise vessel. It bombcd (1986) Libyan targets daiming that the laııer country had planned attacks, an assertion stiIl unsubstantiated. The U.S. daim in respect to Panama agrees with the earlier unproven accusations. Self-defence, on the other hand, is permissible only in response to "armed attaek".
The United States continues the Cold War in the Caribbean although it has melted elsewhere. The Havana rcgime ceascd all aid to insurgents in Latin America, but the United States, which in the past carried out militaey maneuvres near the island and even supported armcd interventions, is stiIl exerting pressure on other countries to curlail commerce with Cuba. Such a policy wilI bring only suffering to the Cuban people. lt is the Cuban pcople, just like the pcoples of Iraq and Libya, who are suffering from a burden imposed on them from outside. One U.S. president af ter another has made no secrel ıhaı American policy aims lo catalyze a chain reaction in that country: trade limitations for more than three decades will cause economic decline, bringing along inOation and shortages; dedining economic condiıions will fcad social umcst, wiıh support from the northern neighbour who wishes to repüssess its "Iosı cülony". American policy has been basically the same when Cuba carried out a new Agrarian Refonn Law (1959), which Lock away almost all of the arable !and owned by the foreigners. WashingLon broke diplomaLic relations with Havana a day afLer Cuba formally charged, before the UniLed Nations, that the United SLates was planning LOin vade Lhe island. JuSLa few months later. in early 196 ı,an invasion force indeed alLacked the Bay of Pigs. Af ter the defeat of this force. atalai U.S. embargo against trade with Cuba went into effecL It continued even af ter the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is now disrupting the lives of the second generatian of Cubans.
Conclusion:
The current tendency to overemphasize the centrality of anarchy and violence in international politics is neiLher realistic. nor usefu!. Such demotion beliules the role of interdependence, hence plurality and the need for democracy in the world system. Although imerdependence is not theopposite of anarchy. it underlines hannonious as weIl as cannieting interests. each gaining from this relationship, but nevertheless struggling for the distribution of these gains. We are all mounLain cIimbers auaehed to a rope. The world is undergoing rapid change. and no country. incIuding the United SLates. can expect to reLain the SLatusquo for a long time. All countries must leam to apply universally recognized principles. Militaey superiority cannot. in the long run, give a political advantage to any quaner. Maximum humanization of politics should be central to a new way of thinking.
It seems that the future of world politics wiII be determined by the Global North-Global SouLh paradigm. The countries of the SouLh, which make up three-quarters of humaniLy and characterized by general poveny. should act like a collective group on the global seene. They may differ in the degrce of achievemem, size and structure or some may fall in the gray area in the Nonh-South division, but Lhey share common traits such as being powerless in the world arena. The North, which may have same pockets of poveny as well, is indifferem or even against the rights, views, aspirations and interests of the Global South, otherwise known during Lhe Cold War as the Third World.
The changes in Eastem Europe and the fonner Soviet Union have made the Nonh-South contradicLion even sharper. While the old East-West axis is being replaced by the dichotomy between the Nonh and the South, the lauer knows that its freedam of movemem is now restricted. The countervailing weight of the Eastem bloc no longer existing, Lhe United SLates has started seuing the agenda of the U.N. SecuriLy Council, which now has a new role mostly in the service of the North. This is a long way from what the situation was only a few years ago.
